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Abstract 
This paper examines alternative determinants of 
intra-industry trade (IIT). Technology transfer via 
vertical FDI can be an alternative determinant to 
distance and country-specific factors in gravity 
equations. Vertical FDI is likely to be made in 
neighbouring countries in the presence of large gaps 
in wages and technology. These large gaps lead to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and promote 
technology transfer from headquarters to overseas 
affiliates. The technology transfer through vertical 
FDI promotes activities in the overseas affiliates and 
thus increases re-imports, which can increase IIT.      
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Previous  Literature 
       A major topic in empirical international trade is the determinants of the proportion of intra-
industry trade (IIT). This paper aims to find the determinants of IIT other than distance and 
country-specific factors, considering the effect of re-imports through vertical foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  
       In the existing literature, trade volume can be explained by the gravity equation, in which the 
determinants of trade volume are GDPs and distance. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) examined 
the determinants of IIT in bilateral pairs by panel data (henceforth HL’s estimation). They sought 
to show the consistency with the findings of Helpman and Krugman (1985) (henceforth the H-K 
model): IIT accounts for a high proportion of trade between countries which have similar sized 
GDP and similar endowments.
1 However, their results have not been successful. A surprising 
result is that the high level of IIT can be observed not only in trade among OECD countries but 
also in trade among non-OECD countries, where inter-industry trade is thought to be significantly 
greater than intra-industry trade. Hummels and Levinsohn then concluded that ``much intra-
industry appears to be specific to country pairs’’ and ``distance is especially important to this 
relationship’’. Nevertheless, two questions arise from their results. First, it remains unclear 
whether the H-K model still has explanatory power in IIT econometric analysis. The other 
question is what do the country-specific factor and the geographical distance imply. 
                                                 
1 Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and Balassa (1986) proposed indices for the proportion of IIT and found a high proportion 
of IIT in trade among developed countries. Applying the H-K model to empirical studies, based on evidence from 14 
OECD countries between 1956 and 1981 Helpman (1987) showed that two similar GDP countries tend to have a 
high proportion of IIT.  2
        HL's estimation seems to have disregarded three important points.
2 First, without 
considering a remarkable trend in IIT from the 1990s onward, the HL estimation was made 
separately in OECD-country trade and non-OECD country trade. The HL estimation seems to 
have regarded the trade between OECD and non-OECD countries as the prima facie fact that it is 
explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model.
3 However, as widely perceived, the currently 
increasing IIT is between OECD and non-OECD countries (Clark and Stanley (1999); Nilsson 
(1999)).
4 This increase cannot be explained by the H-K model as well as the HO theorem, and 
thus two current streams of research have attempted to analyze this phenomenon: one explanation 
is vertical IIT and the other is fragmentation in the production process.
5 
       The second point omitted from the HL estimation is that there still remain some unknown 
country-specific factors in the IIT estimation. HL achieved good results in fixed effect estimation 
in panel data analysis, and in the distance term in the OLS estimate in cross-data analysis. Rice et 
al. (2002) concluded that demand and supply structural similarity in neighbouring countries 
causes distance to be a major determinant of IIT proportion. However, their explanation seems 
still to lack generality. A perfect example is Japan: Japan is far from other OECD countries but 
adjacent to many non-OECD countries, which have totally different supply and demand 
structures. However, the proportion of IIT in Japan is high, not only in trade with the other 
                                                 
2 Debaere (2001) criticized HL's regression for presuming a constant proportion of non-OECD countries in the world 
and for omitting a high correlation between volume of trade (independent variable) and GDP (dependent variable). 
As a result of denominating the volume of trade by GDP, he found that a GDP similarity has a negative impact on 
trade among non-OECD countries. 
3 Evenett and Keller (2003) studied the relationship between IIT explained by the H-K model and inter-industry trade 
explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. They grouped country pairs across the GL index and compared the 
difference in capital ratio among the groups. As a result, they found that the country pairs of high GL index can be 
seen in the pairs of the smaller difference of capital labour ratio. 
4 Clark and Stanley (1999) found evidence of increased IIT in the United States with developing countries. Also, 
Nilson's evidence is based on the IIT of the EU with small developing countries. 
5 The pioneering attempt to provide a theoretical framework of fragmentation is by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990). A 
theory on VIIT was provided by Falvey (1981) and Helpman and Flam (1987). Based on the theory, many empirical 
works studied how country or industry specific factors affect vertical or horizontal IIT. See Greenaway, Hine and 
Milner (1994) (1995), and Fukao, Ishido and Ito (2003).  3
OECD countries but also in trade with other Asian countries (see Figure 5-1). Therefore, this 
stylized fact tells us that distance is still important in the Japanese case, but the cause is totally 
different from that of Rice et al. (2002). There seems to exist some other mechanisms explaining 
the Japanese IIT. One possible mechanism dismissed in HL’s estimation is supply side: 
production networks by multinational firms.
 6 Recent work has pointed out a major influence of 
production networks on international trade (Gould (1994); Rauch (1996); Head and Ries (1998); 
McLaren (1999); Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2003a) (2003b)). 
       The third point missed in HL’s work concerns firm-level behaviours such as multinational 
firms.
7 This is related to the defect in the H-K model. Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 12) 
extended the H-K model to the case of multinational firms, but they admitted the limitation that 
GDP similarity weakens the explanatory power in the presence of the multinational firms, which 
Markusen and Venables (2000) attempted to overcome.
8 This theoretical vagueness has led to 
reluctance in horizontal IIT literature to consider the IIT from the viewpoint of various firm-level 
behaviours such as re-imports by FDI and outsourcing and firm network.  
  The current literature and this paper 
       The literature on intra-firm trade provides us with good insight into the current stream of 
international trade. Antras (2003) presents a wide range of facts on US intra-firm imports.
9 In his 
                                                 
6 They mentioned using per capita income as a proxy, which has two potential problems. One is "whether per capita 
income is proxying factor endowments or consumer tastes"; HL said, "The empirical literature has generally 
interpreted differences in per capita income as a demand side phenomenon."  
7 In discussions on vertical IIT, many empirical studies have considered the effect of FDI on IIT, although many 
never provide a model to explain it. However, Fukao et al. (2003) provided a model and showed empirically that 
vertical IIT is promoted by FDI through division of labour.  
8 Marksen and Venables (2000) mentioned that "the presence of multinational corporations weakens the link between 
the volume of trade and the degree of dispersion in relative size". H-K presumes factor price equalization among 
homogenous firms, but it does not consider technology and wage gap, which is the main cause of vertical FDI. Also, 
it cannot clearly show whether FDI promotes two-way trade or not. 
9 Antras (2003) defined intra-firm US imports as (i) US imports shipped by overseas affiliates to their US parents and 
(ii) US imports shipped to US affiliates by foreign parents.   4
Figure 2, which originally graphed a positive correlation between intra-firm trade and capital 
labour ratio, we see that US intra-firm imports are particularly active with many low wage 
developing countries adjacent to the United States, such as Panama, Mexico and Brazil. The US 
intra-firm imports in these countries are largely above the trend line between intra-firm trade 
activity and their capital labour ratios, suggesting that these countries still have some uncaptured 
factors other than capital labour ratios. The phenomenon is even stronger in Japanese trade. 
Japanese FDI in Asian countries promotes re-imports to Japan.
10  As Ng and Yeats (2003) 
suggested, trade in parts and components plays an important role in Asian trade today, and 
furthermore Japan is becoming a centre of the fragmentation of production process in East Asia. 
   This paper aims to find determinants of IIT that do not involve the traditional determinants, i.e. 
distance and country-specific factors. Reflecting the above stylized facts, we focus on Japanese 
trade in the late 1990s together with HL's estimation, and consider the effect of re-imports 
through (vertical) FDI on IIT. We extend HL's estimation in two ways. First, we consider the 
supply side: technology differences, wage gap, and technology transfer by FDI. These factors 
were dismissed in the HL estimation and were considered as country-specific factors. Second, we 
focus not only on intra-OECD country trade but also on OECD trade with non-OECD countries 
simultaneously in a single estimation. One simple model of technology gap and FDI among 
heterogeneous firms can explain different factors of IIT in intra-OECD country trade and in trade 
with non-OECD countries. 
       There are several reasons for analyzing Japan's IIT in the 1990s using econometric methods. 
The first is to be able to test the generality of previous studies. We can test HL's estimation in the 
trade between OECD and non-OECD countries simultaneously. Also we can examine the 
generality of Rice's discussion. The second reason is that Asian trade is the most active in intra-
                                                 
10 See Fukao and Hoon (1996) on Japanese re-imports.  5
firm trade and trade related to FDI in the world, and the fragmentation of production processes 
largely affects the Japanese trade. Japan is close to Asian countries, and is both a major influence 
and is in turn strongly influenced by other Asian countries. Furthermore, Japanese firms have 
strong production networks through FDI, which largely affects Japanese trade (Lawrence, 1991; 
Okubo 2004; Ando and Kimura 2003; Fukao and Okubo 2004). As a consequence, we find that 
the technology transfer through Japanese FDI increases IIT: technology transfer promotes the 
overseas affiliate and increases re-imports to Japan. As a determinant of IIT, the distance and 
country-specific factors widely used in previous studies can be replaced by technology transfer 
through vertical FDI. 
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic 
model explaining FDI and IIT. In Section 3, we conduct an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of Japanese IIT, and Section 4 presents the paper’s conclusions. 
 
 2. THE BASIC MODEL 
       Current trade theory has shed light on the heterogeneous productivities of firms. Melitz 
(2003) and Helpman, Yeaple and Melitz (2004) modelled different firm behaviours through a 
reallocation effect in the process of trade liberalization. Baldwin and Okubo (2004) applied their 
models to economic geography. This section now applies Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Okubo 
(2004) to FDI and the volume of trade with a comparative advantage in technology, although our 
model cannot perfectly cover their features due to the different aim of the analysis. Unlike the 
Baldwin and Okubo model and the Melitz model, no transport costs are imposed, but instead 
communication costs between headquarters and overseas affiliates are imposed proportional to  6
the geographical distance. The focus is on the effect of vertical FDI on IIT among heterogeneous 
firms, considering technology gaps, wage gaps and communication costs.
11 
 2.1  General  setup 
       We start from the Martin and Rogers (1995) model, which is often called the footloose 
capital (FC) model (see Baldwin et al. (2003), Chapter 3). The FC model works with two 
countries (North and South) and two factors, K (capital) which is mobile and L (labour) which is 
immobile across countries. Worldwide supplies of capital and labour are fixed. Manufactured 
goods are produced under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. The fixed 
cost involves one unit of capital (K) and the variable cost employs ‘a’ units of labour (L) per unit 
of output. The implied cost function for typical firm i can be written as: 
                                                                       i ix wa + π  
where π and w refer to the rewards to capital and labour, ai is firm i’s variable unit input 
requirement, and xi is its output. Importantly, the model assumes that capital owners are 
immobile across countries. Physical capital moves in search of the highest nominal reward since 
its income is spent in the owner’s region regardless of where the capital is employed. In other 
words, all of the capital’s reward is repatriated to its country of origin. The preferences of the 
representative consumer in each country are quasi-linear: 
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where cn is consumption of each variety in an industry, and σ is the constant elasticity of 
                                                 
11 Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) modelled reciprocal trade and FDI, and found that asymmetric equilibrium with 
one-way flow of FDI does not exist. Greaney (2003) introduced network into Baldwin and Ottaviano's model and 
found the existence of one-way flow of FDI in the case of an asymmetric network effect across countries.  7
substitution between the varieties. Here, ‘I’ represents a large number of industries and n is the 
number of varieties produced in an industry. I and n are fixed.
12 
 2.2  Firm  heterogeneity,  FDI  cost and comparative advantage 
       The FC model is applied to IIT and multinational firms without transport costs. First, we 
introduce sunk costs in overseas production, whereas the original FC model considers free 
mobility of firms and capital between the countries. The multinationals need to pay additional 
sunk costs by employing labour, subject to beachhead costs: communication costs for the 
maintenance of overseas production networks. In order to maintain efficient production in 
overseas affiliates, the parents need to supervise the management and quality control by 
promoting face-to-face communication between headquarters and the affiliates. The 
communication by human interaction is conducted by headquarters periodically sending workers 
and CEOs to the affiliate country. This involves communication costs such as travelling costs. 
       Second, as in Melitz (2003), we allow firms to have different unit input coefficients, i.e. 
different ai’s. Then we introduce comparative advantage in varieties between two countries, as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. The North has a comparative advantage in some varieties (from 0 to n), 
whereas the South produces the remainder of varieties (n to 1). The wage is determined by the 
macro economy and thus it is exogenously given for any industry.
13 This partial equilibrium 
approach allows us to consider the distribution of firm-level efficiency as part of each country’s 
endowment. Since each firm is associated with a particular unit of capital, it is natural to assign 
the source of heterogeneity to capital. We assume that each unit of capital in each country is 
associated with a particular level of productive efficiency as measured by the unit labour 
                                                 
12 As in the original FC model, since the endowment of capital is fixed and the number of firms in the world is fixed, 
we need not consider entry and exit. 
13 This is why we assume a very large number of industries.  8
requirement, ‘a’. The distribution assumed is a uniform distribution. We refer to a firm’s ‘a’ as its 
level of inefficiency since this is proportional to its marginal cost of production in equilibrium. 
 2.3  Initial  equilibrium 
       In the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition assumptions on market structure, 
optimal prices are: 
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where ‘aj’ is a typical firm’s marginal cost, and each country has a comparative advantage in 
certain varieties, as shown in Figure 1.  σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any 
two manufactured varieties within a sector. The operating profit earned by a typical firm in a 
typical market is 1/σ times firm-level revenue.
14 Accordingly, operating profit in a northern firm 
is: 
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w is world expenditure on the good and the number of varieties in the world, P is the CES 
price index for all varieties consumed, and H is the beachhead costs for headquarter service. n 
denotes the boundary of the varieties between northern and southern productions, determined so 
as to equalize the profits: 
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Consequently, one relation can be induced from equation (1): 
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14 A typical first order condition is p(1-1/σ)=wa; rearranging, the operating profit, (p-wa)c, equals pc/σ.  9
 
  2.4 Decision-making for firm types: multinational or national 
       Next we consider multinational firms. In search of higher profits, a firm decides to choose a 
multinational or a national firm. In the case of choosing multinationals, the firm is required to pay 
the costs for human interaction between their headquarters and the overseas production plant. The 
communication costs for multinational firms, M, are assumed to be counter-proportional to the 
geographical distance. According to Goldberg et al. (2003), the human interaction between 
headquarters and overseas affiliates is an essential factor for multinationals and thus the FDI is 
negatively correlated with the costs for human interaction measured by distance and travel costs. 
The overseas affiliates employ labour at the wage rates in the host countries, and use technology 
transferred from headquarters in the home country. However, the transfer is imperfect due to the 
gap in educational levels, circumstances for transfer and government regulations. Thus, the 
overseas affiliates use technology represented as ‘ak’ units of labour requirements. 
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where i * p akw =  and k represents the inverse of technology transfer (k>1). The better the 
circumstances for technology transfer (k is close to 1), the easier it is for overseas affiliates to 
operate production using a technology similar to that in the North.
15 On the other hand, if the gap 
in human capital is large, transfer is imperfect (k is much larger than 1) and less efficient 
technology is employed. The change in operating profit is denoted as 
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15 Findley (1978) states that technology transfer through FDI can reduce the technology gap between home and host 
countries.  10
If the above equation is positive, firms have an incentive to become multinationals, and vice 
versa. The larger the positive value in the bracket, the greater the incentive for northern firms to 
become multinationals: necessary conditions are a large wage gap (w*<w) or a large degree of 
technology transfer (i.e. k is close to 1). Then, given k, M is progressively lowered in proportion 
to distance, and firms have more incentive to locate overseas affiliates in neighbouring countries.  
 
Result 1: Efficient firms are likely to become multinationals in the presence of a wage gap. 
Firms in the higher wage country are more likely to be multinationals than in the lower 
wage country. When communication costs gradually reduce due to geographical proximity, 
the first firms to start overseas operations are those most efficient in the higher wage 
neighbouring country. 
 
The result that the most efficient firms are likely to become multinationals is consistent with both 
our study and Helpman et al., regardless of there being no assumption of wage gap in Helpman et 
al. (2004).
16   
 2.5  Final  Equilibrium 
 
The cut-off level for multinationals.    We define the cut-off variety between nationals and 
multinationals as m. Then we provide the condition that characterizes m. We note that the 
emergence of multinationals in the North will change the equilibrium ∆. ∆ is replaced by  i ∆. 
 
                                                 
16 Bernard, Redding and Schott (2004) studied heterogeneous firms in the presence of comparative advantage.   11
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The profits between multinationals and nationals are equalized in variety m: 
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where   ,1 aa k k ≡≥ . The values of k are different across host countries, largely affected by the 
capability to utilize the transferred technology and by educational level. Northern firms with a’s 
in the range [0,m] have 
MNC
mm π π >  and thus become multinationals: they establish overseas 
production in the South with headquarters in the North. It is important to note that n is unchanged 
by multinationals, because wage rates are fixed and equation (1) is always satisfied at n:     
                                                              
**
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Figure 3 plots equation (3) in terms of m and k: a negative correlation. The number of 
multinationals is positively correlated with technology transfer. More technology transfer (small 
k) increases the number of multinationals, given M. This implies that more multinationals emerge 
in the countries with good conditions for technology transfer and a higher educational level, if 
geographical distances from the home country are the same. Now given k, smaller M increases 
the number of multinationals. This implies that more multinationals are located in neighbouring 
countries. This result is consistent with Goldberg et al. (2003). 
 
Result 2: When technology can be transferred easily and affiliated firms can use a similar  12
technology to the firm based in the home country, multinationals emerge. Ceteris paribus, 
overseas production is likely to be located in neighbouring countries. 
 
  2.6 Volume of Trade 
 
       We now calculate the value of exports and imports in the North in the case of a non-
multinational firm. The key is to establish overseas production as multinationals and to re-import 
the products. 
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where R denotes total expenditure on the good (not variety) in the world. Then, the exports and 
imports in the presence of multinationals are 
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The first term in 
MN IM  represents re-imports by overseas affiliates.
17  
 Symmetric  Technology  Case 
       In the symmetric technology case, the relation between the unit labour requirements a and 
variety index j can be written as specific functions like 
                                                 
17 Note that n is fixed even after beginning overseas production, and that R is fixed because the utility function is 
quasi-linear and capital owners are tied to the country, and thus expenditure on the good is constant.   13











if there is no wage gap, n is 0.5 and no wage gap leads to zero in the bracket in equation (2) and 
always gives a negative value in equation (2) (see Figure 1). This means no incentive for all firms 
to become multinationals. It can equalize the value of exports and imports, which is equivalent to 
a maximal amount of IIT. However, this paper assumes a wage gap (w>w*), and thus the 
boundary of traded good (n) is less than 0.5 (see Figure 2-1). The efficient firms become 
multinationals in the case of symmetric technology with a large wage gap.
18 The bracket in 
equation (2) becomes positive, and efficient firms (small ‘a’) in the higher wage country tend to 
have a higher value of the first term. This drives a positive value in equation (2), given the level 
of M. In this case, imports (IM) are always larger than exports (EX) in the North in equation (4). 
The emergence of multinationals increases imports relatively (
mn IM ) and decreases exports 
(
mn EX ) in equation (5), thus reducing the proportion of IIT.  
 
Result 3: Between two countries with symmetric technology and equal wages, 
multinationals never emerge. However, in the case of symmetric technology in the presence 
of a wage gap, multinational firms emerge only in the higher wage country. The increase in 
the number of multinationals always reduces IIT. 
                                                 
18 Note that a two-way FDI never occurs.  14
 Asymmetric  Technology  Case 
       Next we consider an extreme case, where the North has an absolute advantage in technology 
in the presence of a wage gap (Figure 2-3).
19 The function for unit labour requirements can be 
written as  












where j refers to variety index. The efficient northern firms have an incentive to become 
multinationals. To investigate the final equilibrium, Figure 3 plots equation (3), suggesting that 
smaller k and smaller M lead to more multinationals. Figure 4 plots the proportion of IIT in terms 
of k, showing that large and intermediate levels of k increase IIT, but small k decreases IIT. 
Result 4: In the case of asymmetric technology and the presence of a wage gap, FDI and 
technology transfer increase the level of IIT at small and intermediate levels of technology 
transfer. The level of IIT reaches a maximum level of IIT at a certain level of technology 
transfer. However, a large degree of technology transfer decreases the level of IIT. 
 
 
 3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
                                                 
19 See Figure 2-2 for a non-wage case.  15
 3.1  Empirical  Strategy 
 3.1.1  General  Ideas 
       HL's estimation result had several shortcomings. In particular there are still some 
determinants of IIT that the H-K model cannot explain. In this section, we conduct an 
econometric analysis and test for the determinants of IIT between Japan and its 24 major trading 
partners from 1996 through 2000 in order to obtain better results by adding Japanese FDI related 
factors to the HL regression.
20 Based on the evidence that Japan's IIT is active with Asia as 
shown in Figure 5-1, we would expect that Japanese FDI could increase IIT together with 
technology transfer.  
  3.1.2 Data and descriptive discussion 
       We regress the panel data on Japan's trade with 24 countries from 1996 to 2000. The 24 
countries are composed of major Japanese trading partners in each region: Asia, the Americas, 
Europe and Oceania. Using the two-digit level of trade data, the GL index is calculated (see the 
Data Appendix for a list of countries and industries). Figure 5-1 shows that Japan's IIT shares 
(GL index) with Asia did not fall. The rates with Asia have grown steadily over the period. 
Moreover, the GL index with some Asian countries has consistently been as high as those with 
the United States and Europe. For instance, Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan have provided from 0.5 
to 0.6; Malaysia reached more than 0.6 in 2000, while the values with the United States and 
Europe were 0.5 and 0.6 respectively. The most remarkable country is Malaysia, where the value 
has increased from 0.43 to 0.65 in just four years. The technology transfer data are based on 
                                                 
20 As seen in the theoretical model, since the only possibility is a one-way FDI under asymmetric technology in the 
presence of wage gaps, we can focus on one-way flow: Japanese FDI. Also Greaney (2003) suggested that since 
Japanese firms have strong networks in overseas production, the networks increase Japanese FDI, promote re-
imports to Japan, and prevent inward FDI to Japan. The presence of asymmetric production networks leads to a one-
way FDI flow (Japanese FDI) rather than bilateral FDI flows.   16
Japan's receipts from technology exports and Japan's payments for technology imports, taken 
from the Balance of Payments (Bank of Japan). The technology transaction with Japan has some 
noticeable features. As seen in Table 3, Japan's receipts from technology exports definitely 
outstrip Japan's payment for technology imports with most foreign countries. The third column of 
Table 3 represents the export–import ratio, which is much higher in Asian countries than in the 
other countries. In spite of a ratio of less than 5 in Europe and North America apart from Canada 
and Australia, the ratios in Asia are much larger. We can also observe a huge amount of 
technology transfer to other Asian countries from Japan (Figure 5-2). From these stylized facts, 
the high value of Japanese technology exports to Asia seems to correlate with the Japanese 
vertical FDI. For this reason, the technology exports may be related to Japanese FDI and may 
help explain the current surge of Asian IIT.   
 3.1.3  Regressions 
       First of all, we test the traditional hypothesis that IIT diminishes with distance. 
       (6)            1 2 max 3 min 4
ij ij ii i
tt t t GL c Diff GDP GDP DIST ββ β β =+ + + +  
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where DIFF refers to GDP per capita differences between Japan and country i. GL is the GL 
index for each trading partner i with Japan in each year, GDPmax is the GDP in the country 
which has the greater GDP, while GDPmin is the GDP in the country with the smaller GDP, and 
DIST refers to distance from Japan to country i.
21 If the H-K model is generally correct, the 
coefficients of GDPmax should be negative and those of GDPmin should be positive, which 
                                                 
21 See Appendix for detail on definitions.  17
means that the GDP similarity enhances IIT, and DIFF should be negative, which implies similar 
endowments increase the proportion of IIT. Next, our hypothesis that technology transfer leads to 
an increase in IIT is tested by the following equation: 
       (8)                     1 2 max 3 min 4
ij ij ii i
tt t t t GL c DIFF GDP GDP TECH ββ β β =+ + + +  
where TECH represents the sum of Japan's technology payments and receipts with each 
country.
22 This estimation gives an overview of the relationship between technology transfer and 
IIT, hypothesizing that a two-way technology trade increases IIT. 
To investigate more rigorously, the variable of technology transfer should be limited only on the 
technology exports by Japanese parents to Japanese affiliates, because TECH covers all kinds of 
technology transactions, not only FDI-related technology trade but also any other transaction. 
However, our model describes that technology transfer by multinationals increases IIT.  Thus the 
equation is replaced by: 
       (9)                    1 2 max 3 min 4
ii ii i
tt t t t GL c DIFF GDP GDP TECHJPNAFF ββ β β =+ + + +  
 
where TECHJPNAFF is technology transfer related to Japanese FDI. 
       Next, we check robustness by means of some proxies for TECHJPNAFF. The candidate for 
the proxies is the number of workers and CEOs sent to overseas affiliates, JPN workers, who 
promote technology transfer. One way of thinking is that technology licensing needs to be 
associated with some help by Japanese workers in the overseas affiliates, or that the Japanese 
workers promote the transfer of technology and help improve productivity. The other way of 
thinking is increasing productivity through face-to-face communication. The Japanese workers, 
JPN workers, can be a major factor in the contribution to technology improvement in the 
overseas affiliates. The human communication in the overseas affiliates plays the role of transfer 
                                                 
22 Wakasugi (1997) also attempted the HL estimation including macro level data on technology trade, but technology 
transaction did not significantly affect the GL index.      18
of tacit knowledge, know-how and a number of techniques for management, production control 
and R&D. Thus a total number of dispatched Japanese workers and CEOs to each host country is 
used. The other possible proxy is total sales of affiliates, SALES, representing the activity of 
overseas affiliates. As shown in the theoretical model in the last section, a good environment for 
technology transfer in a host country attracts multinational firms and, as a consequence, total 
sales of multinationals in the host country increase. 
       Finally, the background for technology transfer should be analysed in more detail. Since the 
extent of technology transfer is limited by human capital and educational level in each host 
country, we introduce another factor: education level. The gap in average years of schooling 
between Japan and its trade partners can be regarded as technology capacity and potential 
capability in host countries. The less gap in educational years with Japan leads to more 
appropriate circumstances for technology transfer, and thus it could affect the technology transfer 
in multinationals. 
       (10)  1 2 max 3 min 4 5
ii ii i i
tt t t t t GL c DIFF GDP GDP SALES EDU ββ β β β =+ + + + +  
where EDU represents the gap in years of schooling of the total population. 
 3.2  Regression  results 
       We employed Generalized Least Square (GLS) in pooled data analysis. Then, Feasible GLS 
with heteroscedasticity across panels was used, in which the variance for each of the panels is 
presumed to be different but does not allow cross-sectional correlation. The regressions 1-(1) to 
3-(2) in Table 1 report the results for equations (6) and (7). As in traditional estimations, IIT 
significantly diminishes with distance. In particular, the coefficients of Asia dummies are higher 
than those of Europe and NAFTA dummies. This reflects the evidence that the trade with 
neighbouring countries has a higher proportion of IIT. Further, we can see that some country- 19
specific factors exist other than the similarity of factor endowments and GDPs. However, a 
problem is that all GDPmaxs are significantly positive, while they are expected to be negative in 
the HK model. The positive coefficients in GDPmax and GDPmin do not imply that GDP 
similarity increases IIT, which contradicts the prediction in the H-K model. The other factors 
seem to affect this contradicted result. 
       Then, regressions 4 to 5(4) in Table 1 report the result of equations (8) and (9). The 
coefficients of TECH and TECHJPNAFF are significantly positive. As our model implies, 
technology transfer by Japanese multinational firms increases re-imports and then enhances IIT.  
Reflecting our model, this empirical evidence only corresponds to the case of an intermediate or 
small degree of technology transfer in the presence of technology asymmetry and wage gap. 
Using TECHJPNAFF, all variables are significant with reasonable signs. As the H-K model 
predicts, GDP and factor endowment similarity increase IIT; then, as our model predicts, 
technology transfer by multinationals increases IIT. 
       Next, the regressions for robustness are shown in 5(1) to 6(3) in Table 1. The results are 
consistent with the previous regressions. The more Japanese workers and CEOs sent to the 
Japanese overseas affiliates, the more know-how and tacit knowledge the Japanese firms transfer 
or promote the transfer of. The coefficients on total sales are also significantly positive. The 
expansion of the activities by Japanese-affiliated firms increases the IIT with Japan. Further, we 
apply instrumental variable methods to TECHJPNAFF in order to solve for its measurement error 
problem. Both results in 5-(3) and 5-(4) are consistent with those of the FGLS panel estimations: 
technology transfer by the Japanese affiliates increases IIT. Overall, all the other coefficients are 
reasonable and significant. This confirms that technology transfer using Japanese-affiliated firms' 
micro data allows the HK prediction: the similarity of GDP and factor endowments increases the 
proportion of IIT.  20
Finally, 7-(1) to 7-(3) in Table 1 report results for estimation (10). The results are consistent with 
our model: EDUs are significantly negative in all estimations. A small difference of human 
capital with Japan can promote Japanese FDI, the activity of Japanese affiliates, and technology 
transfer. Reflecting our model, the degree of technology transfer is not particularly large: a small 
or intermediate level of transfer increases IIT, whereas large-scale technology transfer decreases 
IIT.         
 3.3  The  data  qualifications and further estimations 
       Although the previous regressions provide us with good insight, some data qualification is 
necessary in TECHJPNAFF and JPN workers. Under the assumption of the same price per 
licence, TECHJPNAFF is induced by Japan's receipts from technology exports weighted by 
license of number total The
FDI via license of number The
. What is worse, the figures for the number of licences are 
available every three years, i.e. 1996 and 1999 in our sample. Thus, the ratios employed by the 
previous regressions are assumed to have grown up at constant rates over time. "JPN workers" 
has a similar qualification. The data on the average number of Japanese workers and CEOs per 
affiliate are available every three years, 1996 and 1999, though the number of overseas affiliates 
is available every year. These assumptions seem to be quite strong. To check the reasonability of 
the assumptions, the following two strategies are used. One is that the same equations are 
regressed only using data in 1996 and 1999, in order to eliminate the above assumptions of 
constant rates of growth. The results are reported in Table 2, which are almost the same as 
previous estimation results: positive coefficients of TECHJPNAFF and JPN workers. Also, 
almost the same values of coefficients can be observed: 0.064 for TECHJPNAFF (0.063 in the 
full sample) and 0.096 for JPN worker (instead of 0.091 in the full sample). In sum, from these  21
results, we can say that the assumptions in the previous estimations are not harmful and the 
regression results are not unreasonable. 
 
 4. CONCLUSIONS 
       Recent years have seen a remarkable increase in IIT between OECD and non-OECD 
countries. Previous studies have sought to explain this phenomenon using VIIT and 
fragmentation rather than the HK model. By contrast, our paper stays with the HK model and the 
HL estimation methodology but expands the model and methodology by considering 
heterogeneity of firm productivity and technology transfer related to FDI. Introducing technology 
transfer through FDI into the HL estimation methodology can explain the current IIT well. 
Favourable circumstances for technology transfer in host countries such as a small difference in 
educational level enhance FDI, which in turn increases re-imports. In the presence of wage and 
technology gaps, IIT increases when the degree of technology transfer is sufficiently small, but a 
large degree of technology transfer decreases IIT.  Our estimation of Japanese IIT patterns 
suggests that although gaps in technology and wages exist with other Asian countries, the 
technology transfer through FDI is not large scale. In addition, technology transfer via the 
vertical FDI is an alternative determinant to distance and country-specific factors in gravity 
equations. Furthermore, if the technology transfer corresponds to production networks, we can 
suggest that production networks promote IIT.       
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DATA APPENDIX 
The components of foreign countries: 
 
Asia: South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, India 
Europe: UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland 
Americas: USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil 
Oceania: New Zealand, Australia 
 
 
The components of industries 
 
This classification is based on Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) categories. 
 
Foodstuffs, raw materials and mineral fuels, textile goods, non-metal mineral products, light 
industrial products, chemical goods, general machinery, electrical machinery, transport 
equipment, and precision instruments. 
 
 
Definitions and data sources of each variable used in the regression analysis 
 
i
t GL  (from 0 to 1) 
 
       The variable 
i
t GL  is defined as the share of IIT in total trade between Japan and each trading 













GL 1 , where I represents industry. We used Japan's bilateral trade data for 
every year at the 2-digit level as in the above mentioned categories of industries. 
 
GDPMAX and GDPMIN (unit: USD million, 1995) 
 
       GDPmax represents the logarithm of the GDP of the country with the larger GDP, and vice 
versa in GDPmin. 
The data on GDP are taken from the International Energy Annual 2001, Energy Information 
Administration. 
 
DIFF (unit: USD, 1995) 
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       DIFF refers to per capita income differences, which is the logarithm of the absolute value of 
GDP per capita. To process GDP per capita, GDP data are divided by population. The population 
data are from the International Energy Annual 2001 (Energy Information Administration). 
 
DIST (km) 
        
       The variable DIST is the logarithm of the geographical distance between the capital of the 
trading partner and Tokyo. 
 
Regional Dummies (0 or 1) 
 
       The variables are composed of three dummies: Asia dummy, NAFTA dummy, Europe 
dummy. 
Asia dummy and Europe dummy represent the component countries in each area. 
NAFTA dummy represents the trade with the United States, Canada and Mexico. 
 
TECH (unit: USD million, 1995) 
 
       TECH is the logarithm of the summation of bilateral technology trade between Japan and 
each trading partner. The data are receipts and payments of loyalty fees. The data are taken from 
the Balance of Payments (Bank of Japan). 
 
TECHJPNAFF (unit: USD million, 1995) 
 
       This variable is defined as the technology exports of Japanese affiliates. TECHJPNAFF is 
induced using the number of licences as follows: 










where TechEX is Japan's receipts from technology exports taken from the Balance of Payments 
(Bank of Japan), licenseFDI represents the number of licences from parents to their affiliates, 
while all-licensing refers the total number of licences by Japanese firms to foreign firms, and 
GDP refers to the host country GDP, taken from the International Energy Annual 2001. Note that 
the loyalty fee for each licence is assumed to be the same. All license data are from the Basic 
Survey of Overseas Activities (METI). TECHEX is taken from the Balance of Payments (Bank 
of Japan). 
 
JPNWORKERS (number of persons) 
 
       The variable is defined as the total number of Japanese workers and CEOs that parent 
companies in Japan send to their affiliates. 
                                    *
i ii
t average t t JPNWORKERS JPNWORKERS NAFF =  
where NAFF represents the number of Japanese affiliates. NAFF is available every year. JPN 
WORKERSaverage refers to the average number of Japanese workers and CEOs across Japanese 
overseas affiliates. This figure is available only every three years (1996 and 1999), and we thus 
assume a constant growth rate for each period.      24
                                
i
average average t1 9 9 6 JPNWORKER =growth rate*(t-1996)*JPNWORKERS ,  
where growth rate is induced by JPNWORKERS in 1996 and 1999. JPNWORKERS and NAFF 
are taken from the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities by METI. 
 
 
SALES (USD million, 1995) 
 
       The variable is a proxy of technology as the activity of Japanese affiliates. The average sales 
across Japanese overseas affiliates in each host country, SALESaverage, and the number of 
affiliates in each host country, NAFF, are available each year. The data are taken from the Basic 
Survey of Overseas Business Activities by METI. To induce SALES, the total sales are 
denominated by GDP in the host country: 
                                            
*
i i








EDU (unit: year) 
 
       The variable represents the gap in years of schooling between the trading partner and Japan 
in each year. The schooling year is an average of all people and is drawn from the Barro-Lee 
Data Set: International Schooling Years and Schooling Quality (www.worldbank.org) 
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 Figure 1:Technology and Comparative Advantage
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Figure 3: FDI and Technology Transfer
The percentages in parentheses represent import ratios in northern trade.
GL refers to the Grubel-Lloyd Index. Since our model is a partial equilibrium analysis,






Figure 4 GL Index and Technology TransferFigure 5-1

































































































































IndiaTable 1 Regression Results 
Dependent variables : GL index
1-(1) 1-(2) 2-(1) 2-(2) 3-(1) 3-(2) 4 5-(1) 5-(2) 5-(3) 5-(4) 6-(1) 6-(2) 6-(3) 7-(1) 7-(2) 7-(3)
DIFF -0.014 -0.017 -0.034 -0.034 -0.02 -0.004 0.002 -0.017 -0.02 -0.026 -0.027 -0.05 -0.046 -0.039 -0.008 -0.033 -0.034
[-3.35]** [-2.50]** [-3.70]** [-4.52]** [-0.88] [-0.62] [0.64] [-3.70]** [-2.82]** [-2.98]** [-2.99]** [-5.03]** [-5.12]** [-4.36]** [-1.94]** [-3.53]** [-3.91]**
GDPmax -0.029 0.342 0.54 0.493 0.12 0.195 -0.424 -0.306 -0.11 -0.215 -0.237 -0.439 -0.478 -0.443 -0.2 -0.418 -0.391
[3.67]** [3.11]** [7.63]** [5.75]** [2.21]** [2.10]** [-9.15]** [-4.73]** [-1.09] [-1.97]** [-2.10]** [-9.42]** [-8.57]** [-7.33]** [-2.84]** [-8.33]** [-6.10]**
GDPmin 0.026 0.021 0.016 0.02 0.027 0.023 0.001 0.089 0.067 0.0818 0.0848 0.021 0.075 0.081 0.081 0.008 0.066











TECHJPNAFF 0.063 0.056 0.076 0.08 0.02 0.069
[12.33]** [6.18]** [7.33]** [7.28]** [1.62]* [12.07]**
JPN Workers 0.091 0.104
[13.64]** [17.97]**
Sales 0.052 0.038 0.054
[11.39]** [3.82]** [12.42]**
EDU -0.029 -0.033 -0.027
[-4.92]** [-8.20]** [-5.34]**
constant -3.328 -4.05 -8.102 -7.402 -1.794 -2.933 6.478 4.746 1.932 3.619 3.966 6.824 7.268 6.767 3.252 6.487 5.998
[-3.01]** [-2.65]** [-7.36]** [-5.76]** [-2.29]** [-2.21]** [9.51]** [4.98]** [1.31]** [2.23]** [2.36]** [9.31]** [8.55]** [7.52]** [3.13]** [8.46]** [6.23]**
Num of sam 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Log Likelih 99.296 139.831 88.641 116.386 99.47 107.075 103.898 103.575 105.388 124 110.099
Chi-2 198.25 1572.58 62.43 721.65 405.02 524.44 331.3 446.05 294.35 1004.59 422.41
R-squared 0.243 0.418 0.066 0.234 0.213 0.205
F 16.85 48.15 15.84 23.28 27.14 27.54
FGLS GLS FGLS GLS FGLS GLS FGLS FGLS GLS IV IV FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Notes:The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in pooled OLS and GLS estimations, and are z-values in panel regressions.
FGLS represents cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression in panel data analysis and GLS refers to regression with robust standard errors in pooled data analysis.
The instrument variables are JPNWORKERS and SALES for the estimation 5-(3) and JPNWORKERS, SALES and EDU for 5-(4). The instrumented variables are TECHJPNAFF in both estimations.
* : Significant at 10% level.
**: Significant at 5 %.Table 2 Robustness for the Results by FGLS
Dependent variables : GL index Table 3 Japan's Technology Receipts and Payments (2000)
8-(1) 8-(2) 8-(3) Country TECHEX THCHIM Ex Ratio
DIFF -0.026 -0.073 -0.061 Korea 371 9.96 37.21
[-3.76]** [-6.20]** [-6.47]** China 487 19.54 24.93
GDPmax -0.346 -0.439 -0.504 Taiwan 491 1.02 481.33
[-2.87]** [-5.80]** [-5.71]** Thailand 508 0.00 --
GDPmin 0.021 0.011 0.074 Singapore 196 15.47 12.65
[1.84]* [1.54] [8.00]** Malaysia 227 0.00 --
TECHJPNA 0.064 Indonesia 169 0.00 --
[7.64]** India 107 2.27 47.17
JPN Workers 0.096 United Kingd 612 124.59 4.91
[13.66]** Sewden 18 86.29 0.21
Sales 0.052 Netherlands 170 170.43 0.99
[10.03]** France 173 138.63 1.25
constant 5.506 13.043 7.824 Germany 121 185.09 0.66
[3.08]** [6.12]** [5.98]** Switzerland 30 179.90 0.17
Italy 52 14.86 3.50
Num of sam 48 48 48 Canada 965 19.22 50.21
United State 4,458 3056.27 1.46
Log Likelih 41.185 47.579 47.032 Australia 84 7.00 11.99
Chi-2 88.39 323.8 157.69 unit : USD million 
Ex Ratio = TECHEX/TECHIM 
Notes:the numbers in parentheses are z-values in panel regressions. Source:Survey of Research and Development 
* : Significant at 10% level. (Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, 
**: Significant at 5 %. Post and Telecommunications)